

Consistent, weakly additive values and two player games*

Miklós Pintér[†]

Abstract

Various types of reduced game and in relation with them various types of consistency are considered. We present a general approach that includes the well-known reduced game and consistency notions, and more. We show that if a value is well-defined on the two player games and it is consistent and additive for the additive games, then it is well-defined generally. Therefore, our result somehow generalizes Sobolev (1975), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and Snijders (1995) among others.

References

- Hart S, Mas-Colell A (1989) Potential, value, and consistency. *Econometrica* 57:589–614
- Snijders C (1995) Axiomatization of the Nucleolus. *Mathematics of Operations Research* 20(1):189–196
- Sobolev AI (1975) A characterization of optimality principles in cooperative games by functional equations (In Russian). In: Vorobyev NN (ed.) *Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences*, Vipusk pp. 92–151

*The author acknowledges the support by National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NKFIH, K 101224, K 115538 and K 119930).

[†]Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Pécs and MTA-BCE “Lendület” Strategic Interactions Research Group, pinterm@ktk.pte.hu.