

# Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value

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## Abstract

In many situations, productive activities take place in a hierarchical structure, where certain players have a veto power over the activities undertaken by some other players. These authority relationships have an impact on the productivity of agents. To model these situations, Gilles et al. (1992) introduce the class of games with a permission structure, which combine TU games and hierarchical structures describing the authority structure. Gilles et al. (1992) define an allocation rule for the class of games with a permission structure, the so-called permission value, and van den Brink et al. (1996) characterize it. In this article, we provide a sufficient condition for the *TU* game such that if we allocate to the agents their permission value, the top-player has an incentive to assign the highest positions in the hierarchy to the most productive players.

**Keywords:** Hierarchies, Permission value, Games with a permission structure.