

Delegation games: a characterization of reported preferences

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Abstract

We analyze a voting game in which agents vote by submitting a full ranking of alternatives, which is aggregated into a set of rankings. The outcome of this set valued social choice rule can be interpreted as a set of delegates, representing the selected rankings of the alternatives. The *reported preferences* social choice rule selects all the reported rankings. We show that the reported preferences rule is characterized by five natural axioms: Pareto Optimality, Consistency, Strategy Proofness, Ballot Neutrality and Independence. We also provide an example in which the Kemeny rule is not Strategy Proof.

Keywords: Social Choice, Kemeny Distance, Strategy Proofness.

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